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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2005, the Supreme Court issued much-anticipated decisions
in a pair of cases challenging the posting of the Ten Commandments on
government property. A sharply divided Court produced a total of ten different opinions in the two cases, articulating a dizzying array of widely divergent interpretations of the Establishment Clause. The bottom line was a
split decision: in Van Orden v. Perry,1 the Court sanctioned a longstanding
Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol,
but in McCreary County v. ACLU,2 the Court refused to countenance two
recent Ten Commandments displays on the walls of Kentucky county
courthouses. The outcomes were ultimately dictated by a single vote—that
of Justice Breyer, the only Justice to vote with the majority in both cases.
Justice Breyer wrote separately in Van Orden to explain his thinking.3
Much attention will surely be paid to Justice Breyer’s enigmatic concur*

Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School,
1996; A.B., Duke University, 1992.
1
125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
2
125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
3
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). In a nutshell, Justice
Breyer eschewed reliance on doctrinal tests to resolve difficult Establishment Clause cases, claiming instead that there is “no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment”—that is, judgment de-
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rence, both because it represents the current governing rule,4 and because it
is fascinating (and profoundly unsatisfying) in its own right.5
Although Justice Breyer’s opinion will likely garner most of the attention, it is neither the most shocking opinion of the lot, nor the one that, in
the long run, has the potential to be the most important. Those distinctions
belong to the opinion of Justice Scalia, whose dissent in McCreary County
may represent the beginnings of a revolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence—a wholesale rethinking of the constitutional relationship between
church and state. According to Justice Scalia’s dissent, Ten Commandments monuments are constitutional because the Establishment Clause
permits the government to favor religion over nonreligion (but not vice
versa), and, in the context of governmental religious expression, to favor
Judeo-Christian monotheism over all other religions (but not vice versa). In
other words, in Justice Scalia’s opinion, biblical monotheism is now, has
always been, and will always be, the favored religion of the United States
Constitution.
To understand the revolutionary nature of Justice Scalia’s opinion,
consider three hypothetical cases:
Case 1: A rural Tennessee town populated primarily by devout Christians erects a massive Ten Commandments monument in the center of
the town square with the express purpose of publicly honoring and expressing a communal belief in the biblical God. A local Hindu family
signed to “reflect and remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the Clause[],” with proper consideration of “context and consequences measured in light of those purposes.” Id. at 2869. Focusing primarily on the alleged intent of the Framers to avoid religious divisiveness, Justice Breyer distinguished
between the Texas and Kentucky monuments largely on the grounds that the historical and physical context of the Texas monument indicate that it was intended to, and did, convey a primarily secular message, whereas the context surrounding the adoption and display of the Kentucky monuments betrayed
“the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted them, and the effect of this readily apparent
objective on those who view them.” Id. at 2871. In particular, Justice Breyer focused on the fact that
the Texas monument had stood for over forty years before it prompted a legal challenge, whereas the
Kentucky monuments were recently erected in a climate of religious divisiveness. “[I]n today’s world,
in a Nation of so many different religious and comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to focus attention upon a religious text is certainly likely to prove divisive in a
way that this longstanding, pre-existing monument has not.” Id.
4
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
5
Initial reactions to the Breyer concurrence by legal academics have not been positive. My colleague, Ira Lupu, has noted that the opinion’s “Breyerian pragmatism . . . cannot be squared with any
theory of equal religious liberty in America.” Posting of Ira Lupu to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/discussion/archives/2005/06/proof_of_secula.html (June 27, 2005, 12:34 EST). Other
scholars have been even more harsh. See, e.g., Posting of Eric Muller to SCOTUSblog, http://www.
scotusblog.com/discussion/archives/2005/06/justice_breyers.html (June 27, 2005, 14:24 EST) (criticizing “the foolishness and naïveté of Justice Breyer’s outcome-determinative concurrence”).
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feels offended and alienated by the monument—especially by its stark
proclamation, endorsed by the government and carved in stone, that
“thou shalt have no other gods before me” and that “thou shalt not bow
down thyself to . . . nor serve” any “graven image”—and immediately
files a lawsuit seeking to have the monument removed.
Case 2: A diverse suburb in Silicon Valley, California, with a majority
population of first- and second-generation Asian immigrants, erects a
monument on the steps of the town statehouse depicting sculptures of
Vishnu and Buddha and proclaiming that one must live a good life in
order to break the cycle of reincarnation and attain enlightenment. Believing that this governmentally sanctioned monument contradicts and
disdains their devoutly held religious beliefs, a local Christian family
quickly files suit seeking to have the monument removed.
Case 3: A university town in Wisconsin erects a stone monument in
the county courthouse that boldly proclaims: “There is No God. All
Laws Come from Mankind Alone.” A local Catholic family takes
great offense and immediately files suit, seeking the monument’s removal.
Under the Court’s traditional Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
these would all be easy cases. All three monuments would violate the core
constitutional mandate of government neutrality in religious matters. The
Court has determined the central meaning of the Establishment Clause to be
that
[g]overnment in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters
of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion
or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.
The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.6

Each of my hypothetical monuments runs afoul of this principle: the first
promotes traditional Western religions; the second promotes certain traditional Eastern religions; and the third promotes nonreligion. The government can do none of those things.
A narrow majority of the Court still adheres to this view. This was the
explicit ground for the majority’s decision to order the removal of Kentucky’s Ten Commandments monuments in McCreary County. Justice
Souter, speaking for a majority of the Court that included Justices Stevens,
O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, reiterated that the requirement of neutrality among religions and between religion and nonreligion is “the touch6

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
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stone” of the Establishment Clause inquiry.7 Thus, the government may not
take action that has the purpose or effect of inhibiting or advancing a particular religion or set of religions, or religion generally.8 “When the government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing
religion,” explained Justice Souter, “it violates that central Establishment
Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no neutrality when
the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”9 Such was the case
with the Kentucky monuments. The monuments were not, on their face,
neutral. Rather, “[t]hey proclaim[ed] the existence of a monotheistic god
(no other gods). They regulate[d] details of religious observation (no
graven images, no sabbath breaking, no vain oath swearing). And they unmistakably rest[ed] even the universally accepted prohibitions (as against
murder, theft, and the like) on the sanction of the divinity . . . .”10 They
were erected for the impermissible purpose of promulgating and celebrating
a particular religious message.11 As such, they were not neutral and could
not withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Even the Court’s more conservative Justices, who would allow the
government greater leeway in religious expression and symbolism cases
than would the Court’s recent majority, have traditionally embraced an understanding of the Establishment Clause pursuant to which all of my hypo7

McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2733.
See id. at 2732–33.
9
Id. at 2733 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2747 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2875–76 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court’s
“‘purpose’ requirement aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker . . . from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.”
Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
10
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2738. The text of the monuments read:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.
8

Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water underneath the earth: Thou shalt not
bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me.
Thou shalt not take the name of the LORD thy God in vain: for the LORD will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain.
Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.
Honour thy father and thy mother: that thy days may be long upon the land which the LORD thy
God giveth thee.
Thou shalt not kill.
Thou shalt not commit adultery.
Thou shalt not steal.
Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.
Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet th[y] neighbor’s wife, nor his
manservant, nor his maidservant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that is th[y] neighbour’s.
Id. at 2730–31.
11
See id. at 2737–41.
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thetical monuments would be unconstitutional. They, too, have accepted
the neutrality mandate, though they have argued that “requiring government
to avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion . . . [cannot] in fairness be viewed as serving the goal of neutrality.”12 They view the neutrality
mandate as a more flexible one, “permit[ting] government some latitude in
recognizing and accommodating the central role religion plays in our society.”13 Still, they have long adhered to the view that the government may
employ monuments and symbols only if they further secular purposes; government may not act “to proselytize on behalf of a particular religion” or religions or nonreligion, as each of my hypothetical monuments surely does.14
Until now, only Justice Thomas had disagreed.15 In recent years, he
has suggested that the Establishment Clause (and its requirement of neutrality) does not apply to the states at all, and therefore, the states are free to favor particular religions as they please, so long as they do not run afoul of
the Free Exercise Clause.16 He has also suggested, as an alternative argument, that even if the Establishment Clause applies to the states, it prevents
only the legal coercion of religious practices; it does not prohibit the government from expressing a preference for, or a belief in, a particular religion
or nonreligion.17 On either of those readings, the aforementioned hypothetical cases are still easy ones; they just come out the other way. None of the
monuments violates the Establishment Clause, either because that clause
does not bind state or local governments, or because it reaches only overtly
coercive government action.
12

County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657–58 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice
Scalia).
13
Id. at 657.
14
Id. at 661; see also id. at 660 (arguing that the Establishment Clause precludes “governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing”). Thus, Justice Kennedy has conceded that
the Establishment Clause “forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the
roof of city hall.” Id. at 661. Of course, the Court’s more conservative Justices, including Justice Kennedy, have voted to uphold government displays of religious symbols like the Ten Commandments,
but—with the exception of Justice Scalia’s opinion in McCreary County—they have done so only on the
grounds that the particular monument at issue does not, in their opinion, seek to proselytize or advance
religion, but rather seeks only to recognize our nation’s religious heritage. See, e.g., id. at 663–67 (relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)); id. at 678–79; Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861–64
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion). The Ten Commandments monument in my hypothetical Case 1, by
contrast, was erected for the purpose of honoring and worshiping God.
15
The only other partial modern exception to the neutrality rule was then-Justice Rehnquist’s solo
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91–111 (1985), in which he argued that the government could
prefer religion over nonreligion, but conceded that it could not prefer one religion or group of religions
over another. Rehnquist did not mention this theory again after his Jaffree dissent, and he appeared (at
least prior to joining Justice Scalia in McCreary County) to have abandoned it. See Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 145 (1992).
16
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49–51 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
17
See id. at 2331–33; Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2865 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Thus, until the Spring of 2005, the one thing that all of the Justices
could seemingly agree upon was that, whatever the proper legal rule, all
three of my hypothetical cases must come out the same way. Either government neutrality is required, in which case all three monuments are unconstitutional, or government neutrality is not required, in which case the
courts must defer to democratic majorities and all three monuments are
constitutional. Either way, the proper resolution of the Establishment
Clause question does not turn on which religion (or lack thereof) the government chooses to endorse; all religions are entitled to equal status under
the Constitution. That much, at least, seemed to be beyond serious dispute.
Not anymore. Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County has upset
that long-settled consensus. Relying primarily on history, Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, has staked out a position pursuant to which the first of my hypothetical monuments (the one
advancing Western religions) would be constitutional, whereas the other
two monuments (the ones advancing Eastern religions and atheism) would
be unconstitutional. In other words, the outcome depends upon which religion the government is supporting. The Establishment Clause affords greater
protection to the believers of some religions (Christianity, Judaism, Islam)
than others (Hinduism, Buddhism, no religion, everything else). Turning
traditional constitutional law on its head, Justice Scalia’s approach treats the
Establishment Clause in the context of governmental religious expression
neither as a mandate for equality, nor as a vehicle for protection of the minority against the tyranny of the majority, but rather as a mechanism for
protecting the majority and the majority alone. And not just that: it appears
that, according to Justice Scalia’s view, the Establishment Clause affords
greater protection only to the majority religious outlook (JudeoChristianity) that was prevalent at the time of the framing. If ever the tables
are turned, and the practitioners of other religions (or of no religion)
achieve majority status in some communities (as imagined in my hypothetical Cases 2 and 3), the Establishment Clause will not extend the same rights
and powers to them that it extends to adherents of Judeo-Christianity. To
Justice Scalia, biblical monotheism is and always shall be the preferred religion of the American Constitution.
The importance of Justice Scalia’s revolutionary opinion should not be
underestimated. While Justice Breyer wrote his controlling opinion only
for himself (and it is difficult to imagine other Justices joining in his largely
idiosyncratic views), Justice Scalia secured the votes of two other Justices,
with perhaps more votes to come as the Court undergoes its first personnel
changes in more than a decade. With Justice O’Connor (one of the Justices
in the five-to-four majority in McCreary County) already retired, Justice
Stevens (another member of the McCreary County majority) recently celebrating his eighty-sixth birthday, and President Bush having declared his in-
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tention to appoint Justices in the mold of Justices Scalia and Thomas,18 Justice Scalia’s view may well command a majority of the Court in the very
near future.19 As such, his opinion demands particularly close scrutiny.
This Article represents a first look at, and an initial criticism of, his
reasoning. Part I examines Justice Scalia’s dissent in some detail, attempting to ascertain its meaning and implications. Part II critiques the dissent
on three principal grounds. First, in Part II.A, I argue that Justice Scalia’s
reasoning is based on a misguided conception of inclusiveness and of minority rights, wrongly suggesting that an equality norm that protects approximately eighty-five percent of Americans, at the expense of the other
fifteen percent, is somehow constitutionally acceptable. Second, in Part
II.B, I argue that Justice Scalia’s defense of his rule on the ground of a perceived need for doctrinal consistency rings hollow, both because his own
rule manifestly does not achieve the consistency that he seeks, and because
it is misguided to insist, in the name of consistency, that the Court’s traditional neutrality mandate is somehow “discredited” by the Court’s pragmatic refusal to immediately extend it to the full extent of its logical reach.
Finally, in Part II.C, I take issue with Justice Scalia’s use of history. I argue
that Justice Scalia’s rule cannot be defended on originalist grounds because,
although it aligns almost perfectly with the political preferences of the Republican Party, it is both theoretically bankrupt and demonstrably not mandated by, nor even supported by, the historical evidence of the original
meaning of the First Amendment on which it is purportedly based. In that
respect, Justice Scalia’s dissent stands as a stark example of the inability of
originalism to produce in practice—even when practiced by its most able
disciples—a genuine apolitical constitutionalism.
THE MEANING OF JUSTICE SCALIA’S DISSENT:
CONSTITUTIONALLY PREFERRED RELIGIONS
Justice Scalia’s dissent is set out in three parts. Parts II and III are
comparatively less interesting, as they are dedicated to the proposition that,
even if one accepts the Court’s existing body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence—including the neutrality mandate—the Kentucky counties’ Ten
Commandments monuments are still constitutional.20 Justice Scalia argues
that, in context, it is clear that the counties displayed the Commandments
“not to teach their binding nature as a religious text, but to show their
I.

18

See Todd S. Purdum, Court in Transition: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005, at A1.
President Bush’s first successful Supreme Court appointment, Chief Justice Roberts, replaced one
of the Justices who joined Justice Scalia’s dissent: Chief Justice Rehnquist. As such, that appointment
cannot have brought Justice Scalia’s view any closer to achieving majority status. President Bush’s second appointment—of Justice Alito to replace Justice O’Connor—may well tell a different story, though
it is too early to know for sure. If President Bush were able to make a third appointment, that appointment could potentially provide a fifth vote for Justice Scalia’s position.
20
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2757–64 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
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unique contribution to the development of the legal system.”21 Accordingly,
their display does not materially advance or favor religion, nor was it intended to do so.22

21

Id. at 2759.
This argument is, frankly, hard to swallow. Even if, Justice Souter’s compelling evidence to the
contrary notwithstanding, Justice Scalia were correct about the legislative purpose—that the Kentucky
counties erected the Ten Commandments monuments as nothing more than “a symbol of the role that
religion played, and continues to play, in our system of government,” id. at 2760—why should that matter? What purpose, other than the advancement or promotion of religion, is served by emphasizing the
alleged religious foundations of our law and government? One could argue that there is a legitimate,
secular legislative purpose in ensuring historical accuracy—in avoiding what Justice Scalia terms “a revisionist agenda of secularization” that rewrites American history to whitewash it of all religious influence. Id. at 2763. But that argument is, in this context, fatally undercut by American history itself. The
Kentucky counties included in their displays a declaration that “the Ten Commandments have profoundly influenced the formation of . . . our country” and “provide the moral background of the Declaration of Independence.” See id. at 2731 (majority opinion). But, as Justice Souter correctly noted, the
Ten Commandments are the quintessential expression of the notion that law comes from God, whereas
the Declaration of Independence is the best known expression of the profoundly different—and at the
time, revolutionary—notion that the legitimacy of law and government comes not from above, but rather
“from the consent of the governed.” Id. at 2740–41; see also Paul Finkelman, The Ten Commandments
on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1510 (2005). Indeed, the entire
American system of government was a direct product of the Enlightenment, a philosophical movement
characterized by an emphasis on reason rather than faith. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters,
111 HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (1998). Many of the most important players in the drafting of the Declaration and the Constitution and in the framing of our nation were Deists, whose Enlightenment-inspired
religious beliefs often rejected the God of the Bible and of the Ten Commandments altogether. See
FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 160–61, 178
(2003); infra Part II.C. In historian Frank Lambert’s words,
[t]he significance of the Enlightenment and Deism for the birth of the American republic, and especially the relationship between church and state within it, can hardly be overstated. In brief, the
United States was conceived not in an Age of Faith such as that of the Puritan Fathers but in an
Age of Reason . . . . The Founders thought that people should be free to seek religious truth
guided only by reason and the dictates of their consciences, and they determined that a secular
state, supporting no religion but protecting all, best served that end.
Id. at 161–62. See generally Finkelman, supra, at 1500–16; Steven K. Greene, The Fount of Everything
Just and Right?: The Ten Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525
(2000).
By the same token, in McCreary County, the claim posted next to the Kentucky monuments that the
Ten Commandments are “codified in Kentucky’s civil and criminal laws,” McCreary County, 125 S. Ct.
at 2729 (internal quotations omitted), is simply false. The Ten Commandments manifestly are not codified in American law, and many of them—such as those prohibiting the worship of other gods and the
making and serving of graven images—could not possibly be enforced without making a mockery of the
First Amendment. See Finkelman, supra, at 1518–19; Marci Hamilton, The Ten Commandments and
American Law: Why Some Christians’ Claims to Legal Hegemony Are Not Consistent with the Historical Record, FINDLAW, Sept. 11, 2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20030911.html. Only two
of the Ten Commandments—the prohibitions against killing and stealing—are actually codified in current law (though with exceptions and defenses not reflected in the biblical text). And, of course, far
from being the unique province of the Bible, those prohibitions are universal. Literally every civilized
society on Earth prohibits murder and theft, regardless of whether it embraces or traces its legal and cultural roots to the Ten Commandments. See Harold J. Berman, Law and Logos, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 143,
159 (1994); Hamilton, supra.
22

1104

100:1097 (2006)

A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?

In this argument, Justice Scalia was joined not only by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, but also by Justice Kennedy, which is not
surprising, as Justice Scalia’s discussion here does little more than recount
the standard conservative line in religious symbolism cases, to which Justice Kennedy has long adhered.23
But Justice Scalia offered Parts II and III of his dissent only as an alternative argument for sustaining the constitutionality of the Ten Commandments monuments. His primary argument is contained in Part I,
which lost the support of Justice Kennedy but held on to the votes of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Part I is anything but a rehashing of
the standard conservative mantra. It is, instead, an all-out assault on the
venerable principle of neutrality, the constitutional foundation upon which
both liberals and conservatives alike had stood steadfast for generations. It
proceeds in two phases: first, as a rejection of the notion that the government must remain neutral as between religion and nonreligion; and second,
as a rejection of the notion that, when it comes to religious symbolism and
governmental expression of religious beliefs, the government must remain
neutral as between different religions.
Justice Scalia begins this assault by canvassing the early history of the
Republic, noting many instances in which governmental actors invoked religion, from George Washington’s adding the words “so help me God” to
the Presidential oath, to the First Congress’s practice of opening legislative
sessions with a prayer, to the early Presidents’ Thanksgiving Proclamations.24 Justice Scalia questions how, in light of this history, the Court can
possibly conclude that the Establishment Clause mandates neutrality between religion and nonreligion and forbids the government from manifesting a purpose to favor religion generally:

Accordingly, if there is any “revisionist agenda”—to use Justice Scalia’s phrase—at work here, it
would seem to be in service of vastly overstating the role of religion and of the Ten Commandments in
the founding of our nation and our legal system. As such, it is difficult to give credence to the argument
that there was any legitimate motivation for these monuments other than the advancement of religion.
23
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858–64 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (arguing that the Texas Ten Commandments monument is constitutional because it simply acknowledges the role played by the Ten Commandments in our nation’s heritage); County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–79 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that the display of a creche in a county courthouse was constitutional because it simply
recognized the role that religion plays in our history and society, and did not seek to endorse or proselytize on behalf of a particular religion); see also City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059–63 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (arguing that monuments depicting the Ten
Commandments are constitutional because the Ten Commandments have a secular significance as a major contributor to our legal codes); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding public display of
a nativity scene on the ground that the government had a secular purpose for erecting the display—
depicting the historical origins of the Christmas holiday—and that the display did not materially advance
religion).
24
See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2748–50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Who says so? Surely not the words of the Constitution. Surely not the history
and traditions that reflect our society’s constant understanding of those words.
Surely not even the current sense of our society, recently reflected in an Act of
Congress adopted unanimously by the Senate and with only 5 nays in the
House of Representatives, criticizing a Court of Appeals opinion that had held
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional.25

Rather, says Justice Scalia, the mandate for governmental neutrality between religion and nonreligion is the product of nothing more than “the
Court’s own say-so.”26
Turning to the principle of neutrality between religions, Justice Scalia
declares, “[t]hat is indeed a valid principle where public aid or assistance to
religion is concerned, or where the free exercise of religion is at issue, but it
necessarily applies in a more limited sense to public acknowledgment of the
Creator.”27 This is so because:
[i]f religion in the public forum had to be entirely nondenominational, there
could be no religion in the public forum at all. One cannot say the word
“God,”or “the Almighty,” one cannot offer public supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of some people that there are many gods,
or that God or the gods pay no attention to human affairs.28

In light of the long historical pedigree of official acknowledgment of God,
that cannot, says Justice Scalia, be the law. Rather, “[w]ith respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief,” the Constitution permits the government to favor Judeo-Christian monotheism; “it is entirely clear from our
Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it permits
the disregard of devout atheists.”29
In a footnote, Justice Scalia goes on to add:
This is not to say that a display of the Ten Commandments could never constitute an impermissible endorsement of a particular religious view. The Establishment Clause would prohibit, for example, governmental endorsement of a
particular version of the Decalogue as authoritative. Here the display of the
Ten Commandments alongside eight secular documents, and the plaque’s explanation for their inclusion, make clear that they were not posted to take sides
in a theological dispute.30

At first blush, this passage might be taken to suggest that official religious
expression—even in support of monotheism—violates the Establishment
Clause unless it is intended to convey a secular, rather than a religious,
25
26
27
28
29
30

Id. at 2750 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 2752.
Id. at 2752–53.
Id. at 2753.
Id. at 2753 n.4.
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message. One might also get that impression from the brief summary of his
position that Justice Scalia offered in Van Orden, the Texas Ten Commandments case decided on the same day. In that case, after joining Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion upholding the Texas monument on the
ground that it conveyed a secular message, Justice Scalia added a separate
concurrence referencing his McCreary County dissent:
I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause
jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation’s past and present practices,
and that can be consistently applied—the central relevant feature of which is
that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally,
honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.31

This apparent proscription against proselytizing might again suggest that
governmental acknowledgments of the divine are unconstitutional unless
they are motivated by secular concerns and convey a secular message.
But that is clearly not what Justice Scalia means to say, as he makes
perfectly clear when he declares that “even an exclusive purpose to foster or
assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating.”32 An exclusive
purpose to foster religious practice is, of course, a nonsecular purpose, and
actions such as honoring God through official prayer and divine acknowledgment, when motivated by that purpose, are a form of proselytization, yet
Justice Scalia is willing to tolerate them. Indeed, at oral argument in Van
Orden, Justice Scalia left no room for doubt that he believes that Ten Commandments monuments are constitutional despite the fact that they convey
a religious, rather than a secular, message:
It’s not a secular message. I mean, if you’re watering it down to say that the
only reason it’s okay is it sends nothing but a secular message, I can’t agree
with you. I think the message [that the Ten Commandments monument] sends
is that law is—and our institutions come from God. And if you don’t think it
conveys that message, I just think you’re kidding yourself.33

What Justice Scalia appears instead to be saying is that the government
is free to endorse Judeo-Christian monotheism, so long as it does not endorse any particular sect or belief within that broad tent. Endorsing “God”
is permissible, but endorsing “Jesus Christ” is not, as the latter endorsement
takes sides in a theological dispute about the true nature of the monotheistic
God.34 In other words, the government can proselytize in the sense of en31

Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2758 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (No. 03-1500), available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1500.pdf (question from Justice Scalia); see also id. at 16 (acknowledging that a Ten Commandments monument conveys “a profound religious message,” rather than a secular one).
34
See also McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Publicly honoring the Ten
Commandments is thus indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned,
32
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couraging and endorsing Western monotheism generally, but it may not encourage or endorse one form of Judeo-Christian monotheism over another.35
That conclusion is, according to Justice Scalia, mandated by American
history: “All of the actions of Washington and the First Congress upon
which I have relied, virtually all Thanksgiving Proclamations throughout
our history, and all the other examples of our Government’s favoring religion that I have cited, have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ.”36 From this
near-unanimity of historical sources, Justice Scalia argues, one can discern
an original understanding that the Constitution permits broad, nonsectarian
invocations of God, but does not permit narrow endorsements of particular,
disputed monotheistic beliefs.37
from publicly honoring God. Both practices are recognized across such a broad and diverse range of the
population—from Christians to Muslims—that they cannot be reasonably understood as a government
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.”); id. (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),
for the proposition that legislative prayer “in the Judeo-Christian tradition” is constitutional so long is it
does not “proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief”).
35
One wonders how, if this is indeed the rule, a Ten Commandments monument could possibly be
constitutional, given that there are a number of different versions of the Decalogue, each endorsed by
different religious sects, and the differences between the versions reflect deep doctrinal disputes. See
Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2879–80 & nn.15–16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting important distinctions
between Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish versions of the Ten Commandments). A governmental Ten
Commandments monument that includes text must necessarily choose one version over the others, thus
endorsing one religious interpretation over the others. Justice Scalia glosses over this problem in a footnote by proclaiming, based only on his own personal knowledge and experience, that most religious adherents would not recognize this problem. See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2762 n.12 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
36
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
37
This conclusion did not come entirely out of the blue. Justice Scalia had been hinting at, and perhaps building toward, it for some time. He had previously expressed concern with the Court’s mandate
that the government may not prefer religion over nonreligion. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
638 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “the government’s interest in fostering respect for religion
generally”); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court’s “bold but unsupportable assertion (given such realities as the text of the Declaration of Independence, the national Thanksgiving Day proclaimed by every President since Lincoln, the inscriptions
on our coins, the words of our Pledge of Allegiance, the invocation with which sessions of our Court are
opened and, come to think of it, the discriminatory protection of freedom of religion in the Constitution)
that government may not ‘convey a message of endorsement of religion’”). In particular, he had long
been a champion of the notion that the government may affirmatively “accommodate” religion, even
when the Free Exercise Clause does not demand it, without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.
See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743–45 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Texas Monthly, 489
U.S. at 38–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615–18, 635 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting). But prior to McCreary County he had always attempted to square that notion with the
neutrality mandate. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the “neutrality
demanded by the religion clauses”); id. at 743 (viewing legislative accommodation of religion as “‘a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference’” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970))); Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 34
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating a “distinction between an unlawful attempt to favor religion” and a
lawful “attempt to guard against the latent dangers of government hostility to religion”); id. at 40 (arguing that legislative accommodations of religion must maintain “the necessary neutrality” and secular
purpose, and conceding that the Constitution will not tolerate it “when accommodation slides over into
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But what about official invocations of atheism, nontheistic religion,
non-Judeo-Christian monotheism, or polytheism? What if the JudeoChristians find themselves in the minority in a particular community, and
the new atheistic or polytheistic majority chooses to officially acknowledge
its preferred beliefs? Does the Constitution permit that? Justice Scalia does
not directly confront this question, but he leaves little doubt that his answer
is no. He is not endorsing a principle that, when it comes to governmental
invocations of religion, majority (or even super-majority) rules. If that were
his position, then he would have permitted, rather than precluded, sectarian,
Christian monuments. He is instead endorsing a narrow, historically based
exception to the principle of neutrality between religions that applies only
to the types of generic Judeo-Christian governmental statements and endorsements that were prevalent around the time of the framing.38
This much is clear from the language of his dissent. He concludes that
the historical record demonstrates only that “the Establishment Clause permits th[e] disregard of polytheists[,] . . . believers in unconcerned deities,
[and] . . . devout atheists.”39 His choice of words here (and throughout his
dissent) is important. He does not say that the Constitution permits the dispromotion, and neutrality into favoritism”); Aguillard, 482 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accepting
the mandate “that governmental ‘neutrality’ toward religion is the preeminent goal of the First Amendment”); id. at 618 (noting that accommodation may not “devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion’”).
Similarly, Justice Scalia had previously hinted that he views government endorsement of nonsectarian monotheism (but not Christianity) as constitutionally permissible. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 641
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring “that our constitutional tradition, from the Declaration of Independence
and the first inaugural address of Washington . . . has, with a few aberrations, ruled out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion . . . where the endorsement is sectarian, in the sense of
specifying details upon which men and women who believe in a benevolent, omnipotent Creator and
Ruler of the world are known to differ (for example, the divinity of Christ)”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (No. 90-1014) (question from Justice Scalia) (“You
cite Thanksgiving proclamations, you cite the God save the United States. I mean we don’t say Jesus
Christ save the United States and this Honorable Court. And I don’t think that would be in accord with
our religious freedom tradition—or, In Jesus Christ We Trust on the coins. We wouldn’t put that in
there, would we?”); Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES 357, 363 (1996) (noting that, at oral argument in Lee v. Weisman, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that the Constitution would permit the use of the phrase “In
Jesus Christ We Trust,” rather than “In God We Trust,” on our coins). But despite these hints, prior to
McCreary County, Justice Scalia had never explicitly stated that the government may depart from the
principle of neutrality between religions in order to endorse biblical monotheism. To the contrary, he
had categorically insisted: “I have always believed, and all my opinions are consistent with the view,
that the Establishment Clause prohibits the favoring of one religion over others.” Grumet, 512 U.S. at
748 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38
Justice Scalia has long advocated the notion that “the meaning of the [Establishment] Clause is to
be determined by reference to historical practices and understandings,” and therefore that practices that
were common in the early years of the Republic must necessarily be constitutional. Weisman, 505 U.S.
at 631–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Grumet, 512 U.S. at 751
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The foremost principle I would apply is fidelity to the longstanding traditions of
our people . . . .”).
39
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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regard of religious minorities (after all, it does not, in his opinion, permit
the disregard of Jews and Muslims); he says that the Constitution permits
the disregard of the adherents of certain, specified species of faith (or lack
thereof): polytheists, believers in unconcerned deities, and atheists. He
forthrightly concedes that, although these persons “are entirely protected by
the Free Exercise Clause, and by those aspects of the Establishment Clause
that do not relate to government acknowledgment of the Creator,” they are
not protected by the aspects of the Establishment Clause that relate to governmental acknowledgment of God.40 It is the substance of their religious
beliefs, not their minority status, that disqualifies them from protection.
Historically, persons holding these beliefs have been disregarded by the
government; as such, the government can continue to disregard them today.
Since there is no comparable historical record of official governmental invocations of atheism or polytheism, the Constitution would not permit the
disregard of believers in monotheism.41
Justice Scalia goes on to say that “governmental invocation of God is
not an establishment.”42 Here again, his words are instructive. He does not
make the broad and neutral claim that the Establishment Clause tolerates all
governmental proclamations about the existence of a god or gods or the
lack thereof (after all, it does not, in his opinion, tolerate invocations of
Christ). Rather, he makes the narrow and one-sided claim that “governmental invocation of God is not an establishment.”43 In other words, the exception to the requirement of governmental neutrality between religions
applies only to “public acknowledgment of the Creator”—not to all public
expression of community sentiments regarding the existence or nonexistence of one or more gods.44 Governmental invocation of God is not an establishment, but governmental rejection of God, or governmental
invocation of Zeus or Vishnu or of polytheism generally is an establish40

Id. at 2756.
Admittedly, there are passages in Justice Scalia’s dissent that focus on the fact that polytheists
and atheists are in the minority—thus perhaps suggesting that the law would treat them differently if
their ranks were to swell. See, e.g., id. at 2753. Most notably, Justice Scalia explains that “in the context of public acknowledgments of God,” the “interest of th[e] minority in not feeling ‘excluded’” must
yield to “the interest of the overwhelming majority of religious believers in being able to give God
thanks and supplication as a people” because “[o]ur national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor
of the majority.” Id. But even here, Justice Scalia emphasizes the national history of invoking the biblical God, rather than a national history of majority rule.
42
Id. See also id. at 2753 (“Historical practices thus demonstrate that there is a distance between
the acknowledgment of a single Creator and the establishment of a religion.”).
43
See also id. at 2750 (rejecting “the Courts’ assertion that governmental affirmation of the society’s belief in God is unconstitutional”).
44
Id. at 2752. For another example of his conspicuously one-sided language, note that Justice
Scalia rejects “the demonstrably false principle that the government cannot favor religion over irreligion,” id., notwithstanding the fact that the majority had articulated that principle to apply evenhandedly: “the touchstone for our analysis is the principle that the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion,” id. at 2733 (majority opinion).
41
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ment, as it—just like governmental invocation of Christ—cannot claim the
sanction of two centuries of historical acquiescence.
Thus, returning to the hypothetical cases proposed at the outset of this
Article, on Justice Scalia’s view, we can expect divergent results. The first
monument—a Ten Commandments display erected for the declared purpose of publicly honoring and expressing a communal belief in the biblical
God—would be constitutional, so long as it did not endorse any particular
Judeo-Christian sect. That a local Hindu family might feel alienated by the
monument is of no matter, for “the Establishment Clause permits this disregard of polytheists.”45
The second monument—depicting sculptures of Vishnu and Buddha,
and proclaiming that one must live a good life in order to break the cycle of
reincarnation and attain enlightenment—and the third monument—
proclaiming: “There is No God. All Laws Come from Mankind Alone”—
would meet with a different result. Neither of these monuments proselytizes for a particular faith. The third monument declares a government endorsement of nonreligion. The second monument depicts figures from two
different faiths (Hinduism and Buddhism) and offers a general statement
about the path to enlightenment that might appeal to the practitioners of a
number of Eastern religions, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, and
Sikhism.46 In that sense, it is not unlike the Ten Commandments monuments: inclusive of the beliefs of a majority of the local population, but offensive and alienating to a minority. But when the local Christians (or Jews
or Muslims) in the minority are offended, their offense does matter, and
their interests, unlike the Hindu family challenging the first monument, are
constitutionally protected.
II. CRITIQUING JUSTICE SCALIA’S APPROACH
In interpreting the Constitution’s other religion clause—the Free Exercise Clause—Justice Scalia has championed the notion of formal neutrality.
With his opinion for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith,47 Justice
45

Id. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting). I apologize for the gross distortion of Hindu theology that may
result from referring to Hindus as “polytheists.” See Brief of Amici Curiae the Hindu Am. Found. &
Others at 8–9, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (No. 03-1500) (“Hinduism propounds a theology of panentheistic monotheism, recognizing that God can be called many names and may take many
forms, and that the means or ways to salvation are many.”). But see Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2881 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to Hinduism as a “polytheistic sect”). Regardless of the proper categorization of Hindu theology, it is clear that Hindus do not worship the God of the Ten Commandments, and
that Justice Scalia thus believes that the Establishment Clause permits the government to disregard their
interests and beliefs.
46
See generally KAREN FARRINGTON, HISTORICAL ATLAS OF RELIGIONS 140–41, 144–45, 154–55,
164 (2002); ROBERT POLLOCK, THE EVERYTHING WORLD’S RELIGION BOOK: DISCOVER THE BELIEFS,
TRADITIONS, AND CULTURES OF ANCIENT AND MODERN RELIGIONS 97–98, 114–15, 169–71, 182–84
(2002).
47
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Scalia revolutionized the law of religious freedom by holding that “the right
of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”48
That rule is ostensibly neutral.49 Formally, it treats all religions the
same way; the adherents of any religion, whether they are Christians or Zoroastrians, may not practice their faith when doing so is inconsistent with a
generally applicable state or federal law. But of course, as Justice Scalia
admitted, the political branches will be far more likely to pass generally applicable laws that interfere with the practice of minority religions than to
enact laws that criminalize acts essential to the practice of majority religions. That is to say, “leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in.”50 For that reason, many commentators have criticized Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Smith for championing an empty formalism that is neutral in theory, but decidedly discriminatory in practice.51
But at least Smith pretended to official neutrality. In his McCreary
County dissent, by contrast, Justice Scalia has done away with the fig leaf
of formal neutrality altogether. The government is free to favor religion
over nonreligion and, in the context of symbolism and endorsement, to favor majority religions over minority religions—and it may do so explicitly
and facially. What is more, this rule is permanently skewed in favor of
Judeo-Christian monotheism. Under Justice Scalia’s free exercise jurisprudence, if Christians ever become a minority (unlikely nationally anytime
soon, but surely possible locally in many places), they will have no recourse
when they find themselves to be the victims of majoritarian, generally applicable laws that impair their ability to worship according to the dictates of
their faith. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander. But under
Justice Scalia’s new establishment jurisprudence, Christians can rest assured that, no matter what happens, they will never have to endure the
alienation of government-sponsored proclamations of religious truths antithetical to their own faith. There is no requirement of governmental neu48

Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1133–36 (1990); id. at 1111 (“The
Smith decision is undoubtedly the most important development in the law of religious freedom in decades.”).
49
See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 726 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (championing neutrality as the touchstone of the Free Exercise Clause).
50
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
51
See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of Religious Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REV. 118,
122–23 (1993); James D. Gordon, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91, 108 (1991);
McConnell, supra note 15, at 139 (arguing that Smith “introduces a bias in favor of mainstream over
nonmainstream religions”); McConnell, supra note 48, at 1133–36 (arguing that the Smith rule is not, in
practice, neutral between religions).
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trality, formal or otherwise; rather, there is an express constitutional preference for certain religions.
If Justice Scalia’s approach becomes the law, it will represent the single greatest sea change in the history of the Establishment Clause. The
principle of governmental neutrality among religions and between religion
and nonreligion has been a central tenet of the Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence for more than half a century—in essence, from the
very beginning.52 All of the Justices have predicated their core understanding of the religion clauses on the view that the government cannot “constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as
against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in
the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.”53 Yet Justice Scalia would cast that decades-old cardinal understanding aside in one fell swoop.
Before Justice Scalia’s opinion, virtually everyone was operating
within the neutrality paradigm.54 The point of disagreement was over
52

One can find loose language in nineteenth-century opinions suggesting a constitutional preference
for Christianity, rather than a constitutional mandate for religious neutrality. See, e.g., Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 470–71 (1892). But those cases did not consider the impact
or the meaning of the Establishment Clause. When the Court first confronted the meaning of the Establishment Clause, it arrived immediately at the mandate for governmental neutrality. The Court first articulated the neutrality principle in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947). Everson
is often referred to as the Court’s first Establishment Clause decision. See, e.g., Diarmuid F.
O’Scannlain, Catholic Lawyers in an Age of Secularism, 43 CATH. LAW. 1, 9 (2004). That is not precisely true; the Court first decided an Establishment Clause case in 1899. See Michael W. McConnell,
The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in
the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2001). “Strictly speaking, several Establishment Clause flavored cases were presented to the Court before Everson, but in each instance the Court narrowed its
holding and decided the case [largely] on non-Establishment Clause grounds.” Charles G. Warren,
Comment, No Need to Stand on Ceremony, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1674 n.14 (2003). Everson was
the first case to incorporate the Establishment Clause against the states, see John C. Jeffries Jr. & James
E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 294 n.74 (2001), and
it represents the beginning of the Court’s modern understanding of religious freedom, see Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH. LAW. 25, 49 (2000). In other words, “Everson provided the Court’s first serious attempt to explain the principle of nonestablishment.” Jesse H.
Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1717 (2000).
53
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (striking down a Maryland constitutional provision
requiring state officeholders to declare a belief in the existence of God).
54
To be sure, there have been academic calls to reject the neutrality principle. See, e.g., Gabriel A.
Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535. But, with the exception of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who once offered a partial challenge to the principle in a solo dissent that he
quickly abandoned, see supra note 15, the Justices have all endorsed the neutrality mandate for over half
a century.
I hasten to add that the neutrality paradigm is, of course, no panacea. The notion of neutrality means
different things to different people, and there has been a great deal of discussion among academics and
judges about the extent to which it is inadequate, manipulable, incapable of deciding hard cases, or even
incoherent. See, e.g., Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values—A Critical Analysis of “Neutrality Theory” and Charitable Choice, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 244–56 (1999) (arguing that the emphasis on neutrality
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whether the Court’s current understanding of the scope of the neutrality
mandate—that is to say, the Court’s working definition of neutrality—was,
in effect, either too hostile toward religion55 or too supportive of majority
religions.56 To be sure, there has been a major shift to the right in Establishment Clause jurisprudence over the course of the last quarter century.
But that shift has occurred entirely within the neutrality paradigm. Indeed,
it has been a triumph of the neutrality principle.
Traditionally, neutrality has competed with the alternative Establishment Clause metaphor of strict separation between church and state. The
Court invoked both metaphors in its very first modern Establishment Clause
decision,57 and it continues to do so today.58 In the more liberal pre-Reagan
era, whenever the two metaphors seemed to come up against one another—
as might be the case when, for instance, religious schools ask for equal acundervalues the positive role that the government should be playing in advancing religious liberty and
equality); Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 994 (1990) (noting that we can “agree on the principle of neutrality without having agreed on anything at all”); Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW.
U. L. REV. 146 (1986) (suggesting that strict neutrality may not always be adequate to protect religious
liberty); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489, 493 (2004) (concluding that “[t]here is no
independent neutral truth or baseline to which [claims of neutrality] can be tethered”); John T. Valauri,
The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 92 (1986) (“The
conceptual complexity, formality, and ambiguity of neutrality are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.
They make the concept abstract and incomplete.”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 878–84 (2000)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has employed the term “neutrality” in Establishment
Clause cases in a number of senses); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Neutrality is, however, a coat of many colors.”). But however open ended and imperfect this
principle may be, the Court has understood it to reflect the core of the Establishment Clause for half a
century.
55
See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305–06 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government neither engage in nor
compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion,
and that it work deterrence of no religious belief. . . . It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward religion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the concept of neutrality can
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not
compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited by it.”).
56
See, e.g., Daan Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45
MD. L. REV. 352 (1986).
57
See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’”); id. at 15 (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can . . . pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.”).
58
In last Term’s Ten Commandments cases, the wall of separation metaphor was invoked both by
those who would uphold the monuments, see Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2859 (2005)
(Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) (noting that the Establishment Clause “demand[s] a separation between church and state”), and those who would strike them down, see id. at 2875 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the religion clauses “erect a wall of separation between church and state”).
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cess to government-funded financial support for teachers—the separationist
metaphor typically won out. The Court was willing to treat religious institutions differently than similarly situated secular institutions in order to
maintain the separation of church and state and to avoid direct government
funding of religious proselytization.59 (The Court did not view that willingness as a repudiation of the neutrality principle, but rather as an implementation of a broader notion of neutrality that focused on total noninterference
with religious institutions as the touchstone of governmental neutrality.)60
In the last twenty-five years, however, the Court has steered a 180degree turn. Neutrality—defined more narrowly as the equal treatment of
religious and secular institutions and expression—has become the central
focus of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, driving notions of
separation of church and state to the constitutional periphery. Today, when
the two metaphors appear to collide, neutrality generally trumps, even if it
leads to significantly more governmental funding of religious activities.61
Thus, for instance, the Court has held that it would not violate the Establishment Clause for a public university to fund sectarian, proselytizing religious newspapers with generally available student activities fees that are
also used to support a wide variety of nonreligious expression,62 or for a local government to include private religious schools on the list of eligible recipients of publicly funded school vouchers.63 The key to all of these cases
has been the demand for strict governmental neutrality; the Court explicitly

59

See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state funding of private-school
teacher salaries because much of the money went to teachers in religious schools).
60
See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 45
(1997) (“In the Court’s view, separation is and always has been a means of maximizing religious liberty,
of minimizing government interference with religion, and thus, of implementing neutrality among faiths
and between faith and disbelief.”); id. at 48 (“In the no-aid theory, the baseline is government inactivity,
because doing nothing neither helps nor hurts religion. Any government aid to religion is a departure
from that baseline, and thus a departure from neutrality.”).
61
See Steven K. Green, Locke v. Davey and the Limits to Neutrality Theory, 77 TEMPLE L. REV.
913, 914 (2004) (noting that the principle that “neutrality or equal treatment should prevail over separationist considerations” has predominated in the last two decades); id. at 933–42 (tracing the history of
the neutrality/separation dichotomy); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 918
(2003) (noting that “norms of non-Establishment have been tending sharply toward the paradigm of
Neutrality and away from the metaphorical wall of church-state separation”); Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering
Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 246 (1993) (“The apparent successor to separationism is some version of religious neutrality, or equal religious liberty.”); id. at 256 (noting the “strong
trend away from the separationist ethos of religion-state relations that prevailed in the liberal culture after the end of the second World War,” in favor of “a neutrality-based view”); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 873–84 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (tracing the development of neutrality principles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
62
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819 (majority opinion).
63
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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based its holdings on the fact that the challenged programs were facially
neutral toward religion.64
The strict neutrality principle has ascended over the vehement dissent
of the Court’s more liberal Justices, who decry the breakdown of the wall of
separation and the attendant increase in government financial support for religious activities.65 But these Justices could, one would have thought, at
least have taken some solace in the fact that, while strict neutrality promotes
some forms of religion in the public sphere, it precludes others. Neutrality
may lead to more government funding of religious activities through generally available funds, but it also precludes government-sponsored religious
expression. After all, as Justice Scalia put it, “[o]ne cannot say the word
‘God,’ or ‘the Almighty,’ one cannot offer public supplication or thanksgiving, without contradicting the beliefs of some people.”66 Leading commentators from across the political spectrum have therefore recognized that the
recent triumph of the strict version of the neutrality principle necessarily
renders unconstitutional most forms of governmental religious expression.67
As Professor Ira Lupu has explained, the ascendancy of the strict neutrality
principle “should result in the least-favored religion getting exactly as much
protection as the most-favored religion. A community that sponsors a
Christmas display should be constitutionally obliged, for example, to devote
equal time and resources to the holy days of Eastern religions to which
some of its residents adhere.”68 Religious conservatives who champion
64

See, e.g., id. at 653 (grounding decision in the fact that “the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion”); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809–14 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion); cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (declaring that it would not violate the Establishment Clause for
the University to open its student activities funds to religious publishers on equal terms with secular
ones because “the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following
neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints,
including religious ones, are broad and diverse”). But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting over the dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas, but not requiring, a state government to exempt religious studies from the scope of a taxpayer-funded college scholarship program in order to maintain a
wall of separation between public money and sectarian proselytizing).
65
See, e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 686–717 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 863–99
(Souter, J., dissenting).
66
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2752–53 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67
See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v.
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 816–17 (2001) (“By
contrast, government-sponsored religious messages can never achieve the status of neutrality among religions. . . . [B]ecause government cannot possibly be evenhanded in its distribution of respect, endorsement, and support, the only sensible constitutional solution for the twenty-first century is some
form of separationist principle designed to keep government from taking positions on matters of religious faith, celebration, and observance.” (footnote omitted)); Michael W. McConnell, State Action and
the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Private Religious
Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 682 (2001) (noting that the modern, neutrality-based trend in Establishment Clause cases necessarily implies that “[i]f religious activity is instigated [or] encouraged . . . by
the government, the government’s acts are unconstitutional”).
68
Lupu, supra note 61, at 277 (footnote omitted).
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neutrality in order to obtain its benefits in funding cases must therefore also
accept its costs in religious expression cases.
But Justice Scalia has found a way to have his cake and eat it too. His
approach offers all of the advantages (from the standpoint of those who
seek a greater role for Judeo-Christian religion in the public sphere) of the
neutrality principle, but none of the costs. Justice Scalia was willing to
provide a crucial fifth vote for strict neutrality when it helped religious conservatives in the funding cases.69 And, as previously noted, he has been the
leader of the Court’s move to formal neutrality as the touchstone of free exercise jurisprudence, a move that has the effect of favoring majority religions at the expense of minority religions. But now Justice Scalia has turned
around and rejected the neutrality principle in those circumstances in which
it would operate against the interests of religious conservatives. He refuses
to accept the costs of the consistent application of the very principle that he
has himself relied upon for decades to bring about major conservative
changes in the jurisprudence of the religion clauses.70
A. Inclusiveness?
How does Justice Scalia justify this radical and seemingly unprincipled
approach? To begin with, his opinion is pervaded with a false—and, to
many Americans, no doubt insulting—rhetoric of inclusiveness. He appears at some level to recognize that governmental endorsement of religious
beliefs that are not universally shared is inconsistent with the values underlying the Establishment Clause. But he concludes that official honoring of
God nonetheless does not present serious Establishment Clause concerns
because generic invocations of God reflect the views of just about everyone:
The three most popular religions in the United States, Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam—which combined account for 97.7% of all believers—are monotheistic. All of them, moreover (Islam included), believe that the Ten Commandments were given by God to Moses, and are divine prescriptions for a
virtuous life. Publicly honoring the Ten Commandments is thus indistinguishable, insofar as discriminating against other religions is concerned, from publicly honoring God. Both practices are recognized across such a broad and
diverse range of the population—from Christians to Muslims—that they can-

69

See, e.g., Zellman, 536 U.S. at 639 (majority opinion) (upholding school voucher program by 5-4
vote, with Justice Scalia in the majority); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 819 (majority opinion) (concluding
by 5-4 vote, with Justice Scalia in the majority, that funding of religious expression on equal terms with
secular expression would not violate the Establishment Clause).
70
Cf. McConnell, supra note 15, at 166 (noting that, if Justice Scalia wants to be logically consistent, he should, in light of his Free Exercise jurisprudence, read the Establishment Clause as precluding
all “government action that singles out religion for favorable treatment”).
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not be reasonably understood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.71

This claim that the Ten Commandments are universal because they
“are recognized across . . . a broad and diverse range of the population—
from Christians to Muslims”—because, as Justice Scalia later says, they
“are recognized by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam alike”72—is reminiscent
of the scene in The Blues Brothers in which Jake and Elwood enter a rural
bar and ask what kind of music they have there. The bartender responds,
“Oh we got both kinds. We got Country, and Western.”73 Justice Scalia is
doing the same thing here—suggesting that the Ten Commandments do not
unconstitutionally alienate because they are recognized by all three kinds of
religion: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
It may well be true that adherents to a variety of faiths, be they Catholics, Southern Baptists, Orthodox Jews, or Sunni Muslims, would all agree
that a Ten Commandments monument is an inclusive memorial that does
not endorse any particular faith.74 But the same cannot be said of atheists or
Buddhists or Wiccans. They would surely understand the government’s actions to be an endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint profoundly
different from their own. In claiming inclusiveness, Justice Scalia is simply
glossing over these people, as if they do not exist at all. Indeed, his statistic
that the three principal Judeo-Christian religions account for 97.7% of all
believers leaves the twenty-nine million American adults who do not profess to follow any religion out of the denominator altogether.75
When he does acknowledge the existence of the sixteen percent of
Americans who are non-Judeo-Christians,76 Justice Scalia takes a fundamentally counter-constitutional approach to their interests. He concludes
that “the Establishment Clause permits th[e] disregard of polytheists[,] . . .
believers in unconcerned deities, [and] . . . devout atheists.”77 After all, he
explains
in the context of public acknowledgments of God there are legitimate competing interests: On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “excluded”; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of
religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a peo71

McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Id. at 2762.
73
THE BLUES BROTHERS (Universal Studios 1980).
74
But see supra note 35.
75
See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbl.67 (124th ed.
2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf. This brings to mind the
first President Bush’s alleged declaration: “I don’t know that atheists should be considered as citizens,
nor should they be considered patriots. This is one nation under God.” Jennifer Spevacek, Atheist
Drops by to Waive the Flag, WASH. TIMES, July 27, 1989, at A4.
76
See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, supra note 75, at tbl.67.
77
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72
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ple, and with respect to our national endeavors. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.78

This is a truly remarkable approach to constitutional law. Our traditional understanding of constitutionalism focuses, of course, on the need for
the judiciary to protect the minority from the tyranny of the majority.79 But
here, Justice Scalia seeks to protect the majority from the inconvenience of
having to respect the rights of the minority. And he does so on the basis of
the fact that, historically, the majority has often engaged in this type of discriminatory behavior.
Imagine if this reasoning had been employed in Brown v. Board of
Education:
In the context of segregation in public schools there are legitimate competing
interests: On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “inferior”; but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of Kansans in
being able to educate their children in the presence of members of their own
race alone. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority.

What a sad Constitution that would be.
Or, to make the analogy in some respects even more apt, imagine a law
that provides that everyone but those of Arab ancestry can fly on airplanes
or serve as law enforcement officers. Such a law would be largely inclusive—protecting over ninety-nine percent of the population—and would not
take sides in the longstanding and divisive rift between the major races in
this country.80 But it would nonetheless run afoul of our most basic notions
of constitutional justice and fairness. Ninety-nine (let alone eighty-four)
percent inclusiveness is a constitutionally meaningless concept. Yet Justice
Scalia’s opinion in McCreary County takes just that approach.
It is no answer to dub these analogies inapt on the theory that the Equal
Protection Clause is explicitly concerned with the equal treatment of the
races, whereas the Establishment Clause is not a mandate for the equal
treatment of religions. After all, government neutrality has been the heart
of the Establishment Clause for decades, and Justice Scalia fully accepts the
78

Id. at 2756; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854
(2005) (No. 03-1500) (question from Justice Scalia) (“It is a profound religious message, but it’s a profound religious message believed in by the vast majority of the American people, just as belief in monotheism is shared by a vast majority of the American people. And our traditions show that there is
nothing wrong with the government reflecting that. I mean, we’re a tolerant society religiously, but just
as the majority has to be tolerant of minority views in matters of religion, it seems to me the minority
has to be tolerant of the majority’s ability to express its belief that government comes from God, which
is what this is about. . . . [T]urn your eyes away if it’s such a big deal to you.”).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
80
Cf. Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IOWA L. REV.
151 (1996) (noting that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which is
famed for its progressive vision of equality between African Americans and whites, contains dicta describing the Chinese as an inferior race).
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view that, absent the exception he intends to create for governmental endorsement of monotheism, the Constitution mandates the equal treatment of
all religions.81
Nor is it an answer to say that the adherents to minority religions or to
no religion suffer no significant harm when the majority chooses to publicly
express an official communal belief in the biblical God.82 Justice Scalia’s
dismissive characterization of the minority adherents’ interest as “not feeling ‘excluded’”83 is reminiscent of his argument in dissent in Lee v. Weisman that students who do not believe in the biblical God suffer only a
“minimal inconvenience” when exposed to official, government-led JudeoChristian prayer at a public junior high school graduation ceremony.84 In
Weisman, Justice Scalia appeared oblivious to the fact that, for a nonbeliever or a practitioner of a non-Judeo-Christian religion, the harm of having either to participate in a prayer that runs counter to one’s core religious
beliefs or to be stared at and ostracized for not doing so is a very serious
one—especially to a teenager trying to fit in and find acceptance in a world
in which she is already an outsider. And here, Justice Scalia seems blind to
the fact that nonmonotheists suffer serious alienation when their government erects and endorses “as a people” a religious monument that explicitly
rejects and condemns nonmonotheists’ deeply held beliefs and practices.
Even Justice Thomas candidly acknowledged “the honest and deeply felt
offense [a nonbeliever] takes from th[is] government conduct.”85
There can be no mistaking the fact that Justice Scalia’s approach is not
inclusive in any meaningful constitutional sense. His rule would create an
explicitly unequal playing field in which the religious majority alone is entitled to constitutional protection from significant governmentally imposed
81

See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that “the principle that
the government cannot favor one religion over another” is “indeed a valid principle where public aid or
assistance to religion is concerned, or where the free exercise of religion is at issue”); cf. Noah Feldman,
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673
(2002); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Litigation, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311 (1986). On the similarity between laws favoring majority religions and laws favoring majority races, see Gary J. Simson, Laws
Intentionally Favoring Mainstream Religions: An Unhelpful Comparison to Race, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
514 (1994).
82
The same argument was, of course, made about segregation. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551 (“We
consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.”).
83
See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (question from Justice
Scalia) (“[T]urn your eyes away if it’s such a big deal to you.”).
84
505 U.S. 577, 646 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2867 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also, e.g., Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Endorsement sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”).
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harms. The Constitution would afford greater protection to the adherents to
certain preferred religions, and would allow the government to endorse and
advance those religions, but not others. This would represent a complete
rethinking of the very nature of our country—of the role that religion plays
in government, and of the rights of religious minorities.
Explaining her decision to join the McCreary County majority and to
reject Justice Scalia’s approach, Justice O’Connor offered a poignant challenge:
At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional boundaries has protected us
from similar travails, while allowing private religious exercise to flourish. . . .
Those who would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has
served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?86

Why indeed? Unconvincing claims of inclusiveness aside, how does
Justice Scalia justify his attempt to radically restructure the fabric of our
constitutional order? His reasoning is based, he explains, on two concerns:
(1) the need for greater consistency in Establishment Clause doctrine; and
(2) the historical evidence of the original meaning of the Establishment
Clause.87
B. Consistency?
He begins with consistency. “What distinguishes the rule of law from
the dictatorship of a shifting Supreme Court majority,” he argues, “is the
absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in
consistently applied principle. That is what prevents judges from ruling
now this way, now that—thumbs up or thumbs down—as their personal
preferences dictate.”88 The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
not, says Justice Scalia, characterized by such a grounding in consistent
principle.89
Although one might question Justice Scalia’s premise that absolute
consistency is necessarily the ultimate goal of constitutional decisionmaking,90 it is difficult to disagree with the basic point that the Court’s establishment jurisprudence wants for doctrinal coherence. Over the last few
decades, the Court has employed a potpourri of doctrinal tests to resolve Establishment Clause disputes, bouncing back and forth from one test to an86

McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2748–57 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88
Id. at 2751.
89
See id. at 2751–52, 2756 n.8.
90
Cf. Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031 (1996) (arguing that consistency is important in law only when it serves the
underlying goal of justice).
87
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other with little or no explanation, often failing to achieve a majority for the
use or proper application of any one test in any particular case.91 All of
those tests, however, proclaim fidelity to the neutrality principle.92 The dispute is over how best to implement that principle doctrinally.
But Justice Scalia is making a deeper point: that the Court has not
even been consistent with regard to the very existence of the neutrality principle. Although the Court has frequently trumpeted and applied that principle, there have been a number of cases in which the Justices have approved
governmental action that does not appear to be neutral toward religion.
“[W]hen the government relieves churches from the obligation to pay property taxes, when it allows students to absent themselves from public school
to take religious classes, and when it exempts religious organizations from
generally applicable prohibitions of religious discrimination, it surely
means to bestow a benefit on religious practice—but we have approved
it.”93 Indeed, the Court has even upheld the Nebraska legislature’s practice
of paying a chaplain to conduct a prayer at the opening of legislative sessions—a practice that would seem to be the very opposite of governmental
neutrality.94
Justice Scalia is surely correct when he notes that a few of the Court’s
decisions—particularly Marsh v. Chambers, which sanctioned legislative
prayer—seem irreconcilable with a mandate for genuine governmental neutrality toward religion.95 But if the goal is, as Justice Scalia claims, a single
consistently applied principle, his own approach, ironically, does not provide one. In his view, neutrality (at least between religions) is the touch91

See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that the Court’s “Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray”); Kent
Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP.
CT. REV. 323, 323 (noting that the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is “in nearly total disarray” and that
“a student of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence [cannot] formulate any general tests that a majority of
the Justices clearly support”). “As exciting as this state of affairs is for those who welcome uncertainty
and change, it is disquieting for lawyers and clients, for judges who must decide . . . establishment
claims, and for Supreme Court Justices who aspire to stable principles of adjudication.” Id.
92
See Moens, supra note 54, at 550.
93
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding an exemption for churches from a federal prohibition against
religious discrimination by employers); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding a property tax exemption for church property); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a law permitting students to leave public schools during the school day to receive religious education at church)).
94
See id. at 2752 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
95
It should be noted, however, that in three of the four cases cited by Justice Scalia, the Court at
least purported (whether convincingly or not) to rest its decision on the neutrality mandate. In Walz and
Amos, the Court interpreted the neutrality principle as a call for “benevolent neutrality”—“permit[ting]
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; see
also Amos, 483 U.S. at 334. In Zorach, the Court declared that refusing to allow students to leave
school to receive religious instruction “would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in
no religion over those who do believe.” Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
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stone “where public aid or assistance to religion is concerned,” but it is not
required when the government acknowledges or endorses God.96 In other
words, a different test applies to governmental expression cases than to all
other Establishment Clause cases. That would seem to be a tacit admission
that the Establishment Clause, as the majority put it, “lacks the comfort of
categorical absolutes”97—a notion that Justice Scalia had earlier mocked as
a “lovely euphemism” for a concession that the Court has committed the
unforgivable sin of failing to employ a single, consistent principle across
the spectrum of establishment cases.98
Every bit as much as the majority’s, then, Justice Scalia’s proposed
rule fails to provide the consistent principle that he seeks. Indeed, if we are
after a consistent jurisprudence that purges the personal, political preferences of individual judges from the process of judging, we should be highly
skeptical of a proposed rule that seems to employ the neutrality principle
only when doing so favors the political interests of religious conservatives.
At a more fundamental level, it is surprising that Justice Scalia would
suggest that the Court’s failure to extend the neutrality principle to its full
logical reach necessitates abandoning that principle altogether (at least as it
applies to neutrality between religion and nonreligion and, in matters of
governmental endorsement, to neutrality between monotheism and other religions). To Justice Scalia, the rule of neutrality “is discredited because the
Court has not had the courage (or the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality
principle consistently.”99 The reason, he says, for the Court’s “occasionally
ignoring the neutrality principle” is
the instinct for self-preservation, and the recognition that the Court, which
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse,” cannot go too far down
the road of an enforced neutrality that contradicts both historical fact and current practice without losing all that sustains it: the willingness of the people to
accept its interpretation of the Constitution as definitive, in preference to the
contrary interpretation of the democratically elected branches.100

There is surely some truth to that observation. The Court’s outlier
opinions sanctioning non-neutral governmental actions may well have been
motivated by a fear of the backlash that could result from the full enforcement of the neutrality principle. That same fear might also explain the
Court’s recent decision to duck the Pledge of Allegiance case on standing
grounds,101 thus avoiding having to grapple with the fact that, far from being

96

McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2752 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2733 n.10 (majority opinion).
98
Id. at 2751 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99
Id.
100
Id. at 2752 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
101
See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (declining to reach the merits
of a constitutional challenge to the use of the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance on the
97
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neutral toward religion, the words “under God” were inserted into the
Pledge during the post-war Red Scare era for the express purpose of encouraging religious devotion and promoting the notion that ours is a religious nation.102 Indeed, one wonders whether the seemingly reluctant
willingness of some of the Court’s more liberal Justices to invoke the notion of “ceremonial deism”—the idea that certain religious expressions,
such as “so help me God” in the Presidential oath and “In God We Trust”
on our currency, have, through rote repetition and general ubiquity, lost
their religious significance to the point that they no longer endorse religion103—is less the product of a genuine belief in the truth of that notion than
the product of the fear that the nation may not tolerate striking down these
emotionally popular but comparatively benign violations of the neutrality
principle.
But so what? Why is the very existence of the neutrality principle fatally “discredited” by the fact that, political realities being what they are, the
Court seemingly does not have the courage or the naiveté to apply it to the
full extent of its logical reach? There have been many instances in American history in which the Court has failed to fully employ or enforce fundamental constitutional principles out of concern for the consequences.
Consider, for instance, Brown v. Board of Education II,104 in which the
Court famously allowed the southern states to drag their feet on the pace of
desegregation—thus emasculating the first Brown decision and permitting
another decade of widespread racial segregation—out of a fear that a demand for timely compliance would prompt a violent backlash.105 Along the
same lines is Naim v. Naim,106 in which the Court, at the insistence of Justice Frankfurter, dismissed on trumped-up technical grounds a case involving the constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute—a statute
that was clearly unconstitutional under the reasoning of Brown. Fearing
ground that the father who brought the lawsuit did not have standing to represent the interests of his
daughter, over whom he did not have parental custody).
102
The House Report accompanying the bill explained:
At this moment of our history the principles underlying our American Government and the American way of life are under attack by a system whose philosophy is at direct odds with our own. Our
American Government is founded on the . . . belief that the human person is important because he
was created by God and endowed by Him with certain inalienable rights which no civil authority
may usurp. The inclusion of God in our pledge therefore would further acknowledge the dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator. At the same
time it would serve to deny the atheistic and materialistic concepts of communism . . . .
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1693, at 1–2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339, 2340. Upon signing the
act, President Eisenhower declared: “From this day forward, the millions of our school children will
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural schoolhouse, the dedication of our Nation
and our people to the Almighty.” 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954).
103
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
105
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 314–16 (2004).
106
350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam); see also Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956).
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that the South would not accept a decision striking such a strong emotional
chord so soon after the original Brown decision, the Court balked, allowing
the vile ban on interracial marriage to persist for a dozen more years.107
One might agree or disagree with the Court’s decision to preference practical considerations over principle in these cases, but it is another thing altogether to suggest that that pragmatic decision “discredits” the underlying
principle itself—discredits, that is, Brown v. Board of Education108 and the
Court’s original conclusion that racial segregation is incompatible with the
Equal Protection Clause.
To the same effect, consider the many McCarthy Era First Amendment
cases in which the Court shied away from protecting the free speech and association rights of Communists out of fear of political backlash from a
paranoid Congress and a frenzied populace.109 Those cases may be said to
“discredit” a number of things, including, perhaps, the Court itself, but they
surely do not discredit the notion that the First Amendment protects political dissenters.
The sad fact is that sometimes genuine equality for scorned minorities
and full enforcement of unpopular rights are politically unpalatable. And
sometimes the Court has chosen to bow to that fact, even at the expense of
doctrinal purity.110 The possible ideal of complete judicial independence is
tempered by the reality that the Court depends upon Congress for its
budget, on the President to enforce its decisions, and on public acceptance
of its decisions for its institutional legitimacy. Fears of jurisdiction stripping, impeachment, widespread disobedience and the like have sometimes
tempered the full reach of constitutional ideals. That may not be satisfying,
but it is and has always been a reality of our constitutional scheme. To
suggest that a principle protecting unpopular minorities or enforcing unpopular rights must be abandoned solely because the Court has feared to extend it immediately to its logical extreme is to impose a perverse heckler’s
veto and to reject a great bulk of modern constitutional liberty.
The logical course of action when faced with a large body of consistent, principled cases and a few outliers is not to reject the general rule, but
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See Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v.
Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423, 1475–76 (1994); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 243 (1991). The Court did not strike down Virginia’s
statute until 1967. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
108
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109
See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1463–64 (2001) (citing, inter alia, Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959) (affirming the power of the House Un-American Activities Committee), and Uphaus v.
Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959) (upholding the unpreempted authority of the states to prosecute subversive
activity aimed at state institutions)).
110
See generally id.
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rather to overrule the outliers,111 or, if that is not politically feasible, to confine them to their facts.112 Indeed, rejecting the general rule altogether
would not seem to serve Justice Scalia’s professed goals at all. If it is apparent and genuine apolitical judicial decisionmaking that Justice Scalia is
after, his proposed solution would be an odd way to go about obtaining it.
To paraphrase another Justice Scalia dissent,113 one would not expect to read
the sentence “What distinguishes the rule of law from the dictatorship of a
shifting Supreme Court majority is the absolutely indispensable requirement that judicial opinions be grounded in consistently applied principle” in
an opinion calling for the abandonment of the one principle that has been at
the heart of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence for more than
half a century.
C. Originalism?
Which brings us to the heart of the matter. Even if Justice Scalia is
correct that consistency demands a new rule for Establishment Clause
cases, why this one? There is a nearly infinite number of possible rules that
the Court could adopt. Why settle on the facially convoluted, tonguetwister of a notion that the government may favor religion over nonreligion,
but may not favor nonreligion over religion,114 and must be neutral between
the various religions, except that it can acknowledge and endorse God, but
only through nonsectarian invocations of the monotheistic God of the Bible? To ask Justice Scalia’s question, “Who says so? Surely not the words
of the Constitution.”115
Surely not. Nor is this rule dictated by precedent, given that the Court
has consistently rejected it. Rather, claims Justice Scalia, this rule is mandated by history. One can determine the meaning of the Establishment
Clause by looking to historical practice to determine what the framing generation understood the clause to permit and to prohibit.
History reveals that, in the nascent years of the Republic, Presidents,
Congress, and even the Supreme Court publicly invoked God.116 As such,
says Justice Scalia, we know that governmental invocations and endorse111

See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2883 n.22 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (calling for
the overruling of Marsh v. Chambers because legislative prayer is inconsistent with the neutrality principle).
112
See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 n.10 (2005) (majority opinion) (treating
legislative prayer dismissively as a unique deviation from the general rule without elaboration).
113
Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984–85 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“‘Liberty
finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.’ One might have feared to encounter this august and sonorous phrase in an opinion defending the real Roe v. Wade, rather than the revised version fabricated today by the authors of the joint opinion.”).
114
See also Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 736 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that
“disfavoring of religion is positively antagonistic to the purposes of the Religion Clauses”).
115
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2750 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116
See id. at 2748–50.
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ments of God do not violate the Establishment Clause.117 But at the same
time, virtually every one of those early invocations was of a generic God;
the Framers publicly endorsed “God,” but not “Jesus Christ.” As such, he
says, we can further deduce that the Establishment Clause permits only
broad, nonsectarian invocations of God; it precludes narrow endorsements
of particular, disputed monotheistic beliefs.118
Justice Scalia derives these conclusions from the originalist premise
that the Establishment Clause must have the exact same meaning and scope
today that it had in the eighteenth century. Of course, that premise is open
to question.119 But let us accept it, if only for the sake of argument.120 Even
so, Justice Scalia’s conclusions do not follow from his evidence.
To begin with, it does not necessarily follow from the fact that many
early Presidents and Congresses engaged in religious prayer and blessing
that the Establishment Clause was generally understood to allow official invocations of the divine. Governmental statements and actions in the decades immediately after ratification are useful data points, but they are not
always the best indicia of original meaning.
That is especially true here. Many of Justice Scalia’s sources are
speeches made by public officials. But “when public officials deliver public speeches, we recognize that their words are not exclusively a transmission from the government because those oratories have embedded within
them the inherently personal views of the speaker as an individual member
of the polity.”121 Today, when President Bush closes a speech with “God
bless the United States,” we understand him to be conveying his personal
religious views and prayers—which he is surely entitled to do, even when
he speaks in his official capacity—not the official views of the institution of
the presidency, or of the national government. The same was true of Presidents Washington and Adams, upon whose speeches Justice Scalia relies.
As such, the content of those speeches tells us little about whether the government is permitted to endorse religion.
What is more, Justice Scalia is selectively drawing upon the historical
record to give the appearance of a historical consensus that did not exist.
He holds out as unambiguous evidence of a universally understood original
meaning actions that, in fact, many of the Framers themselves strongly con117

See id. at 2850.
See id. at 2755.
119
See, e.g., Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for
Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 226–34 (2004) (noting some of the many potential faults of
originalism).
120
While I am willing to accept Justice Scalia’s originalist premise arguendo, ultimately, the fact
that Justice Scalia’s dissent fails to achieve the alleged benefits of originalism might well provide a
powerful reason not to adopt his methodology in the first place. That is to say, the hash that ends up being made of the historical record here by one of the brightest and most talented of originalist judges
might tell us something about the desirability and the viability of originalism as a constitutional theory.
121
Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2883 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118
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demned as unconstitutional.122 For instance, James Madison—who originally proposed the Establishment Clause—fought the First Congress’s decision to hire a legislative chaplain,123 and condemned it as “a palpable
violation of . . . Constitutional principles.”124 Similarly, Thomas Jefferson
refused to issue Thanksgiving prayers because he understood them to violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition against governmental “recommendation” of religion.125 Madison also refused during his early years in
office to issue calls for Thanksgiving prayer. Later, during the politically
contentious War of 1812, he did issue such calls, but he subsequently confessed that his doing so had violated the Constitution.126
As Justice Souter has previously explained,
in the face of the separationist dissent, [governmental actions of the type relied
upon by Justice Scalia] prove, at best, that the Framers simply did not share a
common understanding of the Establishment Clause, and, at worst, that they,
like other politicians, could raise constitutional ideals one day and turn their
backs on them the next.127

The fact that sometimes even the Framers did not have the political will to
follow the Constitution does not provide the government with license to
continue to do so today. Indeed, a constitutionalism that derives current
meaning solely from the governmental actions in the years immediately following ratification would, in many instances, be wholly unacceptable.
Among other things, it would allow the government to criminalize political
dissent and to mandate racial segregation.128
Once we expand our search for the original meaning beyond Justice
Scalia’s often dubious sources—beyond, that is, the statements and actions
of the government officials in the years after the ratification of the First
122

See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 623–26 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
See Letter from J. Madison to E. Livingston (July 10, 1822), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 105 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
124
JAMES MADISON, DETATCHED MEMORANDA 558 (Elizabeth Fleet ed., 1946).
125
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Rev. S. Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 98–99.
126
See MADISON, supra note 124, at 560; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 915 (1789) (noting that
Representative Thomas Tucker voted against the congressional resolution urging President Washington
to issue a Thanksgiving proclamation on the ground that “it is a religious matter, and, as such, is proscribed to us”).
127
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 626 (Souter, J., concurring).
128
See id. (“Ten years after proposing the First Amendment, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, measures patently unconstitutional by modern standards. If the early Congress’s political actions were determinative, and not merely relevant, evidence of constitutional meaning, we would have to
gut our current First Amendment doctrine to make room for political censorship.”); Van Orden v. Perry,
125 S. Ct. 2854, 2885 n.27 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To adopt such an interpretive approach
would misguidedly give authoritative weight to the fact that the Congress that passed the Fourteenth
Amendment also enacted laws that tolerated segregation, and the fact that the Congress that passed the
First Amendment also enacted laws, such as the Alien and Sedition Act, that indisputably violated our
present understanding of the First Amendment.”).
123
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Amendment—the history paints a very different picture. As others have
persuasively demonstrated, and I will not retread that ground here, the text,
historical antecedents, drafting history, and debate surrounding the adoption
of the Establishment Clause all provide compelling, though perhaps not
conclusive, evidence that the clause was intended and originally understood
to preclude government preference for particular religions or for religion
over nonreligion, as the Court has long understood.129 Justice Scalia ignores
this voluminous evidence.
In any event, even assuming that Justice Scalia’s sources are the best
indicia of the original meaning of the Establishment Clause, those sources
still do not mandate Justice Scalia’s rule—in particular, his conclusion that
the government may endorse generic monotheism but not generic or sectarian Christianity. Why should it matter that the framing generation preferred
to refer to the divine using certain terms—“Almighty God,” “the Creator,”
“that Almighty Being,” etc.—rather than others? Justice Scalia’s historical
sources do not, for instance, include references to “Merciful God” or the
“Supreme Being.” Does that mean that the Establishment Clause forbids
the government to use those terms? Surely not. But then why does the absence of official endorsements of “Jesus Christ” or the “Holy Trinity” indicate that those endorsements are precluded by the Establishment Clause?
Evidence that the framing generation routinely engaged in certain practices
might, in some circumstances, tell us what the Constitution permits. But, as
a matter of common sense, that argument has little traction in reverse. Evidence that the framing generation did not engage in certain practices is a
particularly bad measure of what the Constitution prohibits, absent both
concrete indicia of the reasons why the Framers chose not to engage in
those practices and some theoretical explanation for why the Constitution
would prohibit those practices, while permitting others.130 Justice Scalia has
provided neither. Rather, he seems to assume that the mere fact that the
Framers did not choose sectarian words is itself sufficient to establish that
the Constitution does not allow their use. But that cannot possibly be true.
To begin with, the particular words chosen by the framing generation
can illuminate constitutional meaning only if that choice was a conscious
reflection of the conventional understanding of the limits of the constitutional prohibition at issue—only if, that is, the fact that the Framers chose
129

See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 612–16 (Souter, J., concurring); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 91–119 (1986); Douglas Laycock,
“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875
(1986).
130
Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 949 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“While we have
indicated that the express consideration and resolution of difficult constitutional issues by the First Congress in particular provides contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning . . . ,
we have never suggested that the failure of the early Congresses to address the scope of federal power in
a particular area or to exercise a particular authority was an argument against its existence.” (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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those words can fairly be taken to indicate that they believed that the Constitution did not allow them to choose others.
By way of analogy, during the Adams Administration, one finds a
great many persons who were highly critical of President Adams, but virtually none who were critical of former President Washington.131 It would be
nonsensical to take that fact as conclusive evidence that the Framers understood the First Amendment to permit criticism of the current President but
to preclude criticism of former Presidents. The lack of criticism of Washington tells us a great deal about the esteem in which he was held by his
contemporaries—and perhaps also about the social conventions of the era.
It tells us nothing about the meaning of the First Amendment.
The same is true here. Justice Scalia has given us no evidence that the
mere fact that the Framers preferred “Almighty God” to “Jesus Christ” indicates that they felt that they had no constitutional choice in the matter.
The closest that he comes is a footnote that could be read as an unsupported
suggestion that if the Framers thought that they could invoke the Christian
God, rather than simply the generic God of monotheism, “one would expect
Christ regularly to be invoked, which He is not.”132
But there are many equally or more plausible explanations for the
Framers’ choice of words. For one thing, they may have eschewed invoking Christ not because they felt that they were precluded from doing so, but
rather because they did not believe in Christ. While there is no scholarly
consensus, many historians have concluded that Jefferson, Washington,
Madison, Adams, and a great many other leading lights of the framing generation were Deists, rather than Christians.133 In this regard, it is especially
egregious for Justice Scalia to rely on their statements as evidence that the
Constitution permits explicit endorsement of the biblical God. In endorsing
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See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 484, 532–34 (2001).
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2753 n.3 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia’s only evidence that the government cannot favor Christians over Jews and Muslims is the fact
that George Washington wrote a letter to a Jewish congregation in Rhode Island in which he assured the
Jews that “[a]ll possess alike liberty of conscience and immunities of citizenship. It is now no more that
toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights.” 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES
285 (W.W. Abbott ed., 1996). But that quotation is about free exercise of religion; it says nothing about
whether the government can endorse religion. And, in any event, it says that “all possess alike liberty,”
not just all Judeo-Christian monotheists.
133
See, e.g., McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2745 n.26; LAMBERT, supra note 22, at 161; Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational Challenge to
First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 875–76 (1995). Deism was “a religious perspective spawned by the Enlightenment, a European philosophy that emphasized reason over revelation
as the best guide for human progress, and nature over Scripture as the clearest window onto God.”
LAMBERT, supra note 21, at 159–60. Deists denied the divinity of Christ and viewed many Christian
beliefs as “superstitions.” Id. at 160–61, 178.
132
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a generic “God,” the Deist Framers may not have been invoking the God of
the Bible at all.134
Or perhaps the framing generation’s use of broader terms to invoke the
divine was simply the convention of the era, rather than a reaction to perceived constitutional constraints. Indeed, similar references permeate the
major pre-Constitutional documents that were not, of course, constrained by
the not-yet-existent Establishment Clause. The Declaration of Independence, for instance, refers to the “Creator.” The Articles of Confederation
refer to the “Great Governor of the World.”135 Jefferson’s Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom of 1779 refers to “Almighty God.”136 And Madison’s famous “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, 1785” refers to “the Creator” and “the Supreme Lawgiver of
the Universe.”137
Or perhaps the decision to employ broad, nonsectarian terms was simply a political one, made out of either a genuine respect for religious minorities or a shrewd desire to avoid alienating voters. The fact that no
President has ever criticized NASCAR for not being a real sport says nothing about whether the Constitution would permit the President to do so.
Justice Scalia has provided no evidence to support a conclusion that the
Framers chose broad words not for one of these (or a hundred other) reasons, but rather because of a perceived constitutional necessity. Without
such evidence, Justice Scalia’s sources simply cannot sustain the rule that
he would derive from them.
Justice Scalia has also failed to provide any theoretical justification for
his conclusion that the Constitution allows broad invocations of monotheism, but not narrow invocations of Christianity. One cannot conclude from
the fact that the Framers did X but not Y that the Constitution permits X but
not Y, unless one can articulate a principled rule that explains why, in light
of the text and purpose of the constitutional provision at issue, X would be
permissible, but Y would not. To return to the example of political criticism
during the Adams administration, one cannot infer from the fact that the
134

See LAMBERT, supra note 22, at 172, 174, 178 (noting that Deists did not believe in a vengeful
God who interfered in the affairs of men, and believed that the Bible, “far from containing divine truth,
is a mixture of sound moral instruction and errors and superstitions” and should not be treated as God’s
word); cf. Finkelman, supra note 22, at 1509 (“The primary author of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson, was a deist, and his references to a supreme being are clearly not references to the God of the Bible.
Rather, they are invocations of enlightenment notions of natural rights.”). As such, Justice Scalia’s
claim that, by invoking “God (in the singular, and with a capital G),” the Framers must necessarily have
been invoking the biblical God and endorsing the Ten Commandments, McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at
2753 n.3, ignores the existence of one of the principal religions of the framing era.
135
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.
136
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1779, reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 77.
137
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 1785, reprinted in
5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 123, at 82.
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framing generation criticized Adams but not Washington that the First
Amendment allows criticism of current but not former Presidents, because
there is nothing in the text of the Free Speech Clause that would support
such a distinction, and the distinction would in no way advance the values
underlying the guarantee of freedom of speech.
The same is true here. There is no basis in the text of the Establishment Clause for Justice Scalia’s distinction, and, save for his mistaken
claims of inclusiveness, he has provided absolutely no theoretical explanation of how allowing the government to endorse monotheism, but not allowing the government to endorse any specific sect of monotheism (or any
other set of religious beliefs), can be said to advance any notion of religious
liberty protected by that clause. If the purpose of the Establishment Clause
is to protect religious minorities, then why protect some minorities, but not
others? If the purpose of the Clause is to avoid formal coercion of religious
practices, but not to interfere with the ability of a majority of the people to
acknowledge and give thanks to their God through the mechanism of their
government, then why preclude them from acknowledging the Christian
God that the vast majority of them worship? The only possible underlying
constitutional purpose that might be advanced by Justice Scalia’s rule
would be a purpose to promote and protect biblical monotheism generally,
but to treat all of its various sects—but not any other religious groups—
equally. A purpose, that is, to prefer Islam to Hinduism, but not Christianity to Islam. But Justice Scalia has provided absolutely no evidence that
this was the impetus behind, or the value underlying, the Constitution’s religion clauses, and to the best of my knowledge no legal scholar or historian
has ever so posited.138
In sum, it requires an enormous and unjustifiable leap of faith to interpret the framing generation’s broad invocations of God as conclusive evidence that the Constitution allows such invocations, but does not allow
more narrow endorsements of particular sects of Judeo-Christian monotheism.
If one were determined to derive a constitutional rule from the fact that
early government actors frequently invoked God, a few possibilities come
to mind. First, one could conclude that the government is free to endorse
whatever religion it wants. That is to say, these actions could be read as an
indication that the Establishment Clause does not bar governmental proclamation and acknowledgment of religion. But that rule would seem to run
contrary to the very point of the religion clauses: to protect religious minorities. The historical evidence is overwhelming that one of the primary

138

Indeed, if this is the underlying purpose of the Establishment Clause, then why does Justice
Scalia continue to endorse the proposition that, when it comes to government funding, the Constitution
necessitates the equal treatment of all religions?
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purposes of the First Amendment was the protection of minority religions
through the guarantee that the government would treat all religions alike.139
Alternatively, one could take these invocations as an indication that the
Establishment Clause permits the government to endorse only nonsectarian
Christianity. That was, after all, the religion actually being invoked and
supported in Justice Scalia’s historical examples,140 and there is absolutely
no evidence that the speakers chose broad words out of a perceived constitutional mandate to be solicitous of other forms of monotheism. As Justice
Stevens explains in his Van Orden dissent, some members of the framing
generation apparently understood the Establishment Clause to protect only
Christians.141 In Joseph Story’s opinion,
[p]robably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the [First]
amendment . . . , the general, if not the universal sentiment in America was,
that christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state. . . . An attempt
to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter
indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation.142

According to Story, the “real object of the amendment was, not to countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by
prostrating christianity; but to exclude all rivalry among christian sects.”143
But this interpretation also fails to protect all religious minorities. And it
runs afoul of the substantial contrary evidence that the Framers sought to
ensure the equal treatment of all religions, even non-Christian (and indeed
even non-Judeo-Christian) ones.144
139

See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919,
932–34 (2004); McConnell, supra note 48, at 1130–31; Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 133, at 874–
961. To take just one example, the amendments proposed by Virginia, North Carolina, New York, and
Rhode Island as precursors to the Establishment Clause all provided that no particular “religious sect or
society ought to be favored or established by law in preference to others.” 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT,
DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 659 (Ayer Co. 1988) (1888); 4 id. at 244;
1 id. at 328, 334. In Madison’s words, “[a]mong the features peculiar to the political system of the
United States is the perfect equality of rights which it secures to every religious sect.” Letter from
James Madison to Dr. de la Motta (Aug., 1820), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, 1816–1828, at 178, 179 (Phillip R. Fendall ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
140
Unless the speakers were endorsing Deism, a religion that does not embrace the God of the Bible
and the Ten Commandments at all.
141
See Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2885–87 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1874, at 593
(1851) (footnote omitted).
143
Id. § 1877, at 594.
144
For instance, Jefferson recounts evidence that, during the debate over Virginia’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom—a major precursor to the Establishment Clause—“a great majority . . .
meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the
Mohametan, the Hindoo, and Infidel of every denomination.” 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
67 (Albert E. Bergh ed., 1907). In the North Carolina ratification debate, James Iredell discussed Article
VI, clause 3, which prohibits religious tests for public office: “[I]t is objected that the people of Amer-
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In light of the constitutional purpose to protect religious minorities and
majorities alike, if one were determined to engage in the mystical practice
of reading tea leaves to ascertain constitutional meaning from the words
that the Framers did not say, Justice Scalia’s sources might better be taken
to suggest an original understanding that the government cannot engage in
acknowledgment or endorsement of disputed religious principles. That
would better explain why they tended to invoke God in terms broad enough
to be acceptable to all of the principal religious minorities of the day, even
Deists and Jews. And unlike Justice Scalia’s rule, it would establish a principle of liberty that accords with the underlying purpose of the Establishment Clause, rather than simply articulating an abstract description of the
framing generation’s actions at a level of generality so specific as to be utterly devoid of principle. It would also have the advantage of according
with the bulk of the other historical evidence of original meaning, with
more than a half century of precedent, and with notions of genuine religious
equality.
Of course, today, that rule would produce a different result. There is
far wider and deeper religious diversity in this country today than there was
in the eighteenth century, to the point that governmental acknowledgment
or endorsement of religion is no longer possible without alienating and dismissing the views of millions of Americans.
Finally, there is yet another reason why the history does not support
Justice Scalia’s proposed rule. Justice Scalia asserts that, of the early historical sources upon which he has relied, only one constitutes a narrow governmental endorsement of Christianity—President Adams’s 1798
Thanksgiving proclamation asking God for absolution “through the Redeemer of the World.”145 That one exception would seem, on its own, to
disprove the rule. If the decision to use broad terms was the product not of
a free choice to prefer those terms, but rather of a universal understanding
that the Establishment Clause precluded endorsement of Christianity over
other forms of monotheism, then why did Adams feel entitled to endorse
Christianity, and why wasn’t there an outcry and controversy when he—the
President of the United States—did so in such a public fashion?146
ica may perhaps choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that Pagans and Mahometans
may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that
principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for?” 4 ELLIOT, supra note 139,
at 197; see also, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
1785, in THE COMPLETE MADISON 299–301 (S. Padover ed., 1953) (“Who does not see that the same
authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?”); Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 133, at 926–27 (quoting similar statements in the Massachusetts ratification convention); Letter
from J. Madison to E. Livingston, supra note 123, at 105 (noting “the equality of all religious sects in
the eye of the Constitution”).
145
McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2755 & n.5 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
146
As noted above, there was a dispute and outcry among the framing generation as to whether the
government was permitted to endorse religion at all. But Justice Scalia points to no indication in the his-
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But in any event, Justice Scalia is simply wrong when he asserts that,
this one exception aside, “all [of] the other examples of our Government’s
favoring religion that [he] cited,” and in particular “[a]ll of the actions of
. . . the First Congress upon which [he] relied, . . . invoked God, but not Jesus Christ.”147 That is demonstrably false.
In Justice Scalia’s own words, he “relied primarily upon official acts
and official proclamations of the United States or of the component
branches of its Government, including the First Congress’s beginning of the
tradition of legislative prayer to God, [and] its appointment of congressional
chaplains.”148 But the First Congress did not just begin a tradition of “legislative prayer to God;” it began a tradition of legislative prayer to Jesus
Christ. That is to say, the practice of appointing congressional chaplains
has not endorsed generic monotheism; it has endorsed Christianity. Every
single one of the 121 congressional chaplains in American history has been
an ordained Christian minister.149 And from the very beginning, their
prayers have been overtly Christian in nature. For instance, Bishop William
White, who served as Senate Chaplain from 1790 to 1800, explained his
typical practice in that post:
My practice, in the presence of each house of congress, was in the following
series: the Lord’s prayer; the collect Ash Wednesday; that for peace; that for
grace; the prayer for the President of the United States; the prayer for Congress; the prayer for all conditions of men; the general thanksgiving; St. Chrysostom’s Prayer; the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, etc.150

What is more, the congressional chaplains did not just conduct Christian
prayers at the opening of sessions of Congress. They also held Sunday
Christian church services in the Capitol Building—services that were open
to and widely attended by the general public.151
Indeed, Justice Scalia so mischaracterizes the history that he errs even
in declaring that only one of the early presidential Thanksgiving proclamations—the one issued by President Adams in 1798—invoked Jesus Christ
rather than a generic God.152 In fact, during his presidency, Adams issued
torical record that endorsements of Christianity rather than monotheism produced any greater outcry or
controversy.
147
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148
Id. at 2754.
149
See MILDRED AMER, HOUSE AND SENATE CHAPLAINS (2005), available at http://www.senate.
gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS20427.pdf.
150
Letter from Bishop William White to Reverend Henry D. Johns (Dec. 29, 1830), reprinted in
BIRD WILSON, MEMOIR OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT REVEREND WILLIAM WHITE, D.D., BISHOP OF THE
PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 322 (1939).
151
See 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 499–501 (1950);
Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083,
2105 (1996).
152
See McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2755 & n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring that “virtually
all Thanksgiving Proclamations throughout our history . . . have invoked God, but not Jesus Christ,” and

1135

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

two Thanksgiving proclamations, both of which were of a decidedly Christian nature. Adams’s second proclamation, issued just a year after the one
noted by Justice Scalia, explicitly invoked the Christian Trinity and asked
all Americans to
call to mind our numerous offenses against the Most High God, confess them
before Him with the sincerest penitence, implore His pardoning mercy,
through the Great Mediator and Redeemer, for our past transgressions, and that
through the grace of His Holy Spirit we may be disposed and enabled to yield
a more suitable obedience to His righteous requisitions in time to come.153

This proclamation was written for the President by the Reverend Ashbel
Green, the Chaplain of the House of Representatives. In his autobiography,
Reverend Green explained that the proclamation’s undeniably Christian
character was both intentional and obvious:
To remove the complaint which I knew the religious community of our country had made, namely, that the proclamation[s] [of President Washington] calling them to the duty of thanksgiving or fasting lacked a decidedly Christian
spirit, I resolved to write one of an evangelical character which should not be
liable to this objection, and to take the risk of its being objected or altered by
the President. This I accordingly did, and my draught was published with only
the alteration of two or three words not at all affecting the religious character
of my production. The commendation bestowed on this proclamation by the
pious people of our country was ardent and general. It was of course supposed
that the President had written it himself, and I said and did nothing to undeceive them. Indeed the sanction given it by the President made it virtually his
own act.154

As such, the reference to Christ in Adams’s first Thanksgiving Proclamation of 1798 was not, as Justice Scalia alleges, a lone exception to an otherwise pervasive practice. To the contrary, the first twenty-five years of the
Republic saw only four presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations (two by
Washington and two by Adams),155 half of which were overtly Christian.
Another early data point that Justice Scalia conspicuously did not mention is the joint resolution of the First Congress that “after the oath [of office] shall have been administered to the President, he, attended by the
Vice-President, and members of the Senate, and House of Representatives,
claiming that “[t]he two exceptions are the March 23, 1798 proclamation of John Adams, which asks
God ‘freely to remit all our offenses’ ‘through the Redeemer of the World,’ and the November 17, 1972
proclamation of Richard Nixon, which stated, ‘From Moses at the Red Sea to Jesus preparing to feed the
multitudes, the Scriptures summon us to words and deeds of gratitude, even before divine blessings are
fully perceived’” (citations omitted)).
153
See John Adams, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation (Nov. 28, 1799), available at http://www.
pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1789.htm.
154
ASHBEL GREEN & JOSEPH H. JONES, THE LIFE OF ASHBEL GREEN 270–71 (1849); see also id. at
554.
155
See Pilgrim Hall Museum, Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations 1789–1815, http://www.
pilgrimhall.org/ThanxProc1789.htm (last visited Jan 28, 2006).

1136

100:1097 (2006)

A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?

[shall] proceed to St. Paul’s Chapel, to hear divine service, to be performed
by the chaplain of Congress.”156 In accordance with this resolution, George
Washington walked to St. Paul’s with members of Congress immediately
after being sworn in as President.157 At the ensuing church service, the Senate Chaplain read prayers from the Book of Common Prayer,158 an Episcopalian prayer book that is composed exclusively of prayers to Jesus
Christ.159 As one historian has explained, “[i]t is to be noted that this was
not a service provided by an Episcopal church to which senators and representatives were invited, but an official service carefully arranged for by
both houses of Congress and conducted by their duly elected chaplain.”160
Clearly, many of the official actions of the framing generation invoked
and endorsed the Christian God, not just the biblical God.161 There is, accordingly, simply no rational way to derive Justice Scalia’s proposed rule
from the historical sources on which he purports to rely.162
The fact that Justice Scalia would preclude governmental endorsement
of and favoritism toward Christianity should be at least somewhat comforting to those who value religious liberty and nonestablishment. It appears
that, while he may be at ease with the monotheistic majority using the government to acknowledge and pray as a people to a generic God, Justice
Scalia is uncomfortable with the notion that the Constitution would allow
the government to engage in blatant Christian religious expression and endorsement, such as erecting a giant cross on the Capitol Building or placing
Jesus Christ on the dollar bill. But the problem for Justice Scalia is that he
156

Epstein, supra note 151, at 2106–07; see also STOKES, supra note 151, at 485.
See Epstein, supra note 151, at 2107.
158
See id.
159
See BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER (1789), available at http://justus.anglican.org/resources/bcp/
1789/BCP_1789.htm.
160
STOKES, supra note 151, at 485.
161
These actions of the early Presidents and Congresses—usually but not exclusively choosing to
endorse God in general terms—are not entirely inconsistent with a rule that the government cannot endorse controversial religious views, so long as we are willing to acknowledge the obvious truths that not
all of the Framers were on the same page regarding the exact contours of the establishment principle,
and that sometimes even the framing generation did not always scrupulously enforce the Constitution to
its full extent. After all, even when the government did engage in actions that supported Christianity
alone, it still evinced a desire to be inclusive, at least among Christians. Thus, when the Congress
agreed to appoint chaplains, it provided that the House and Senate chaplains must be of different denominations, and that the two chaplains must alternate weekly between the two houses of Congress. See
id. at 456.
162
Indeed, if these sources do lead to the conclusion that the government need not be neutral between religions (so long as it is neutral between monotheistic sects), then why does that rule extend only
to the government’s acknowledgment of the divine? Why do these sources not establish a broader principle of constitutionally preferred monotheism that undermines the mandate for neutrality among all
religions in funding and other cases as well? Justice Scalia points to no evidence from the framing era
that shows that the Framers intended to treat acknowledgment cases differently from other cases. Cf.
Lupu, supra note 67, at 775–79 (arguing that the framing generation did not yet conceive of acknowledgment cases as presenting establishment concerns).
157
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claims to derive his rule (and, in particular, its crucial stopping point) solely
from historical practices, yet the historical practices do not support the proposed rule. And at that point, he has nothing to fall back on—neither a coherent theoretical defense of his position, nor an underlying constitutional
value or principle that his position can be said to serve. He offers neither,
because neither can be found. When it is stripped of its faulty originalist
dressing, his rule is exposed as nothing more than a personal vision of the
proper relationship between church and state, untethered to text, history,
theory, equality, or precedent.
CONCLUSION
To its champions, the chief benefit of an originalist mode of constitutional interpretation is its ability to decide cases without reference to the
personal policy preferences of the judges.163 An originalist judge can, the
argument goes, determine constitutional meaning by looking to the objective historical record, rather than to his or her own subjective political values. There are many scholars who argue that this benefit is illusory:
because the historical sources invariably point in more than one direction,
they fail to constrain judges from reaching their preferred political result.164
That is to say, because there is no single, objective original meaning that
can be discerned from the incomplete and often contradictory historical record, originalism pretends to an apolitical objectivity that it cannot deliver.165
Justice Scalia’s dissent in McCreary County may well become Exhibit
A in support of that conclusion.166 Justice Scalia claims, and I trust that he
genuinely believes, that history compels the conclusion that the Establishment Clause allows the government to prefer religion over nonreligion (but
not vice versa) and to prefer Judeo-Christian religions over all other religions in the category of cases that is now at the forefront of the culture
wars.167 This rule neatly mirrors the political agenda of the religious right.
163

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 7, 143–53 (1990); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863–64 (1989).
164
See Smith, supra note 119, at 230.
165
For an argument that this is particularly true with regard to Establishment Clause issues, see
Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial Philosophy: Originalism
and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343 (1993). See also Ravitch, supra note 54, at
556–57.
166
See, e.g., Posting of Jack M. Balkin to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/06/justicescalia-puts-his-cards-on-table.html (June 27, 2005, 12:53 EST).
167
See David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment
Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 584–85 (2002) (arguing that “Establishment Clause concerns are most
acutely presented in modern America by official religious messages”); Jeffrey Gettleman, Alabama’s
Top Judge Defiant on Commandments’ Display, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at A1 (describing the efforts of Alabama’s Judge Roy Moore and his supporters to preserve a Ten Commandments monument in
the Alabama Supreme Court).
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At the same time, Justice Scalia has concluded that history establishes that
our Constitution does not prefer Christians over Jews, which benefits the
Republican Party in its aggressive push to win the support of Jewish voters,168 or over Muslims, which benefits the President in his crucial attempts
during the War on Terror to convince the Muslim world that the United
States respects Islam and is not waging war against it.169 This interpretation
of the Establishment Clause aligns almost perfectly with the political preferences of the Republican Party, but it is both theoretically bankrupt and
demonstrably not mandated by, nor even supported by, the multifaceted historical evidence of the original meaning of the First Amendment on which
it is ostensibly based. The fact that Justice Scalia, surely one of the most intellectually gifted judges of our time, and surely one of the most articulate,
careful, and compelling champions of originalism ever to pick up a pen, has
produced an opinion that mistakenly claims a historical mandate for what
appears in reality to be a purely political conclusion raises serious questions
about the promise of originalism as a workable, neutral constitutional theory.
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion has the potential to catalyze a revolution in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, one hopes that the Court’s
new Justices will recognize the flaws in Justice Scalia’s theory, and will
stay the course in preserving constitutional protections for all religious minorities.

168

See Matthew E. Berger, Bush Names New Liaison to Jewish Community, JERUSALEM POST, June
2, 2005, at 6 (noting “the Republican Party’s push to make inroads into the Jewish community”).
169
See Editorial, World to the Wise, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 2002, at A18 (“Ominously, the U.S.
war on terrorism met opposition by majorities in virtually every Muslim society, even allies such as
Turkey and Pakistan and even in countries outside the affected region such as Indonesia and Senegal.
This suggests that, despite the Bush administration’s protestations to the contrary, much of the Muslim
world still equates the war on terrorism with a war on Islam. The United States must redouble actions
that distinguish the two.”).
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